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FLOUTING THE LAW
JANICE NADLER
What happens when a person’s common sense view of justice 
diverges from the sense of justice he or she sees enshrined in 
particular laws? In particular, does the perception of one particular 
law as unjust make an individual less likely to comply with 
unrelated laws? This Article advances the Flouting Thesis – the idea 
that the perceived legitimacy of one law can influence one’s 
willingness to comply with unrelated laws – and provides original 
experimental evidence to support this thesis. This Article presents 
new, original evidence that one’s willingness to disobey the law can 
extend far beyond the particular unjust law in question, to the 
flouting of unrelated laws commonly encountered in everyday life 
(such as traffic violations, petty theft, and copyright restrictions). A 
second experiment demonstrated that when exposure to a perceived 
unjust outcome made gender salient by highlighting an instance in 
which the law fails to punish a male perpetrator involved in a crime 
of violence against a female victim, the relationship between 
perceived injustice and compliance was affected by group identity. 
Finally, the Article explores the relationship between perceived 
injustice and flouting and offers several possible explanations, 
including the role of law in American popular culture, and the 
expressive function of the law in producing compliance.
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INTRODUCTION
Do ordinary citizens flout the law in response to a specific 
instance of perceived injustice? The idea that general lawbreaking
can emerge from one unjust legal doctrine or decision has intuitive 
appeal. For example, Professor David Cole has argued that 
constitutional doctrines that allow untrammeled police discretion --
such as that which led to the brutal beating of Rodney King in Los 
Angeles or the tragic police shooting of Amadou Diallo in New York 
-- can undermine the public’s perception of the legitimacy of law 
enforcement generally.1 This loss of legitimacy and distrust of the 
fairness of the legal system, Cole argues, can in turn lead to more 
widespread lawbreaking.2
The Rodney King example is instructive in this regard. In 
1992, the acquittal of the four police officers who beat Rodney King 
touched off the worst civil unrest seen in any American city in nearly 
30 years. The streets of Los Angeles became the site of chaos and 
lawlessness for four days, as city residents looted stores, destroyed 
property, assaulted and shot one another, and set fires to buildings.
When it was over, more than fifty people were dead,3 over 12,000 
people were arrested,4 and over 800 buildings were burned to the 
ground.5 Undoubtedly, the causes contributing to the expression of 
community frustration during this time are numerous and complex.
However, there is no doubt that the perceived injustice of the 
acquittals of the police officers was a “proximate” cause of the 1992 
civil unrest in Los Angeles.6
1 See David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New 
Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 Geo. L.J. 1059, 1090-91 (1999); see also DAVID COLE, 
NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 169-80 (1999). Indeed Cole argues that for people who distrust the legal 
system, violation of the law is often “romanticized, idealized, condoned, or even 
celebrated.” Id. at 1091. 
2 Id.
3 See Washington Post, April 28, 1997, at A04, Scars Remain Five Years After Los 
Angeles Riots, by Lou Cannon.
4 See The Boston Globe, May 5, 1992, at 13, Life Regains its Bustle in Los Angeles, 
by Diego Ribadeneira.
5 See Washington Post, supra note 3.
6 The initial beating incident and subsequent trial were both widely publicized; the 
videotape of the beatings was played repeatedly in the months leading up to the 
trial; the jury’s decision to acquit the police officers was widely held to be unjust.  
8/30/2004 FLOUTING THE LAW 3
The 1992 Los Angeles example is an extreme one to be sure. 
At the same time, it suggests further, more general questions –
questions that are at bottom empirical -- about whether and under 
what circumstances citizens’ perceptions of injustice lead to 
diminished deference to the law generally. Does perceived injustice 
in our legal system -- whether in the form of wrongful convictions or 
acquittals, excessive punitive damage awards, outmoded public 
morals statutes, crack/powder cocaine sentencing disparities, 
mandatory minimum sentencing regimes -- lead to greater 
willingness to flout the law in the everyday lives of ordinary people?
Further, assuming that this is the case, does flouting typically 
manifest itself not in mass unrest but in more subtle, lower-level, 
harder-to-detect ways, such as littering, tax cheating, theft of 
services, and jury nullification?
The idea that there is a relationship between perceived 
injustice of specific laws and diminished general compliance with 
the law has been either proposed or assumed by many theorists in a 
variety of contexts. 7 For the purposes of discussion in this Article, I 
call this idea the Flouting Thesis. Despite its prominence, there is, 
however, a glaring absence of empirical evidence regarding the 
Flouting Thesis, which has been widely assumed but never proven.8
Investigating the possibility that lawbreaking can flow from 
perceived injustice is central to our understanding of how to secure 
citizen cooperation and compliance with legal rules, and so the lack 
of empirical investigation regarding the Flouting Thesis is puzzling. 
This Article begins to fill this void by presenting the first 
experimental evidence for the Flouting Thesis, and by empirically 
See The Economist, April 22, 1992, Page 22, World Politics and Current Affairs; 
American Survey. For some, these feelings of injustice were so strong that they led 
to extreme frustration and anger, as evidenced by the sharp increase in 
lawbreaking over the next few days.
7 See infra Section II. 
8 Although different but related theories have been tested empirically – see Section 
II infra – an exhaustive literature search revealed no experimental test of the thesis 
that there is a relationship between perceived injustice of legal rules or decisions
and reduced compliance with the law generally. In other work, I have emphasized 
the importance, as a general matter, of reducing arbitrariness in the application of 
the law. See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of 
Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153; Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact 
Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419 (2003).
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confirming that perceived9 legal injustices can have subtle but 
pervasive influences on a person’s deference to the law in his or her 
everyday life. In this Article, I argue that Americans are culturally 
attentive to law, and feel concerned when they notice injustice in the 
legal system. When a person evaluates particular legal rules, 
decisions, or practices as unjust, the diminished respect for the legal 
system that follows can destabilize otherwise law-abiding behavior. 
Because there are reasons for obeying the law apart from the threat 
of sanctions, obedience to law is vulnerable to diminished respect 
produced by perceptions of injustice.10
The broader focus of this Article is on the ways in which law 
can influence citizen behavior other than through threatened 
punishment. As such this Article is part of a broader movement 
emerging in legal scholarship that examines theories of expressive 
law.11 For example, Cass Sunstein and others have argued that, in 
addition to influencing behavior directly, law also can make a 
statement that strengthens desirable norms and weakens undesirable 
norms.12 For example, anti-discrimination laws may have weakened 
the norm of racial discrimination; laws that require clean-up after 
one’s pet may strengthen the norm of cleaning up, even in the 
absence of enforcement.13 Others, such as Richard McAdams have 
focused on the mechanisms through which the values the law 
expresses can induce compliance, quite independently from the 
9 I use the term “perceived injustice” throughout the paper because my focus is on 
the psychology of justice, and more specifically, on the justice perceptions of 
ordinary people.  I do not address in this paper philosophical issues regarding 
justice, and I make no assumptions about the actual justness of the underlying 
legal rules or legal outcomes that I discuss.
10 In addition to providing original experimental evidence for the Flouting Thesis, 
a key objective of this Article is to draw attention to the necessity for further 
empirical and theoretical investigation.
11 The idea that law has a symbolic function apart from directing behavior by 
imposing punishment on violators is fundamental to the law and society literature. 
See, e.g., JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 112 (1974).
12 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 
(1996). Similarly, Lawrence Lessig has argued that law can change the norms that 
underlie the social meaning associated with the behavior regulated. See Lawrence 
Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996).
13 See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 2032, 2043.
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sanctions the law threatens. 14 For example, laws banning smoking 
signaled to smokers a new societal consensus that exposing others to 
smoke is offensive and antisocial, triggering smokers to refrain from 
smoking in certain public places for fear of enduring objections from 
people nearby.15 The anti-smoking values expressed by law induced 
smokers to comply with minimal state enforcement of anti-smoking 
ordinances. More closely related to the topic of this Article, scholars 
focusing on compliance with criminal law have also noted that the 
expressive power of law can backfire when a law inadvertently 
generates disrespect. For example, a well-publicized government 
crackdown on tax cheating can implicitly send the message that 
everyone cheats, thereby generating more cheating than would be 
observed without the crackdown.16 More generally, these scholars 
argue that when law is perceived as failing to accurately reflect
popular notions of justice, then citizens will be less likely to view the 
law as a moral authority that guides their own behavior.17 It is this 
theory of expressive law that I test empirically in this Article.
Before presenting the evidence that injustice can encourage 
lawbreaking, I first discuss in Part I the theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings of the Flouting Thesis, including the reasons for 
believing that perceived unjust laws can generate general disrespect 
and increased lawbreaking. In Part II, I report the results of two
original laboratory experiments which suggest that perceived legal 
injustice can indeed reduce people’s willingness to obey laws in their 
everyday lives, like speed limits and copyright restrictions, and can 
also reduce citizens’ willingness to follow the law in their role as 
jurors in the courtroom. In Part III of the Article I explore potential 
explanations for why perceived injustice in the legal system might 
14 See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 338, 355 (1997). See also Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order 
Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 390, 401-02 (1994), ("The route by which laws create and maintain 
order is through the creation or alteration of social norms . . . Our thesis is that 
decentralized order is accomplished by internalizing as social norms those laws 
that are just and perceived to be fair.").
15 See McAdams, supra note 14. at 405.
16 See Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U.L. REV. 333 (2001).
17 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U.L. REV. 
453 (1997).
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cause citizens to have less deference for the law; in Part IV I discuss
possible remedies.
In this Article I describe two experiments in which I expose 
people to instances of legal injustice, and then measure their 
willingness to break the law in their everyday lives. Together, these 
two experiments contemplate two different prototypes of perceived 
injustice in the law that can have consequences that reach beyond the 
rule or case in question. The first (examined in Experiment 1) is a 
legal rule that is viewed by most people as being ill-conceived, such 
as a rule permitting the government to seize the property of an 
innocent farmer who whose land is used by a marijuana grower. The 
second (examined in Experiment 2) is a legal result whereby the law 
does not punish a person who is viewed by most people as 
deserving of punishment.18 The results of these two experiments 
show empirically that discrepancies between common sense justice 
and legal practices have behavioral consequences, as well as advance 
the discussion about how to reduce these discrepancies by 
selectively harmonizing legal rules and social norms.
I. THEORIES OF LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND PERCEIVED INJUSTICE
As noted earlier, perceived legal injustice can take a variety of 
forms. The 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest arose as a response to 
public outrage about acquittals in a widely-publicized criminal trial. 
Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that clash with strongly held 
popular beliefs are a second form of perceived injustice. Indeed, 
certain Justices of the U. S. Supreme Court at various times have 
assumed the truth of the Flouting Thesis when faced with the 
prospect that the Court’s announced decision will be at odds with 
commonsense justice. For example, in discussing the permissibility 
of police wiretapping without a search warrant, Justice Brandeis 
argued in his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States: “If the 
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it 
18 There are undoubtedly many other types and sources of perceived legal 
injustice. Accordingly, this Article does not aspire to enumerate the all of the 
boundary conditions of the relationship between perceived injustice and 
lawbreaking – there are many possible circumstances under which the law can 
inadvertently generate disrespect, and this Article does not seek to catalog them 
here.
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invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites 
anarchy.”19 Similarly, in discussing the application of antitrust laws 
to baseball, Justice Marshall expressed concern that the Court’s 
decision would undermine respect for law:
…[T]he jurist concerned with public confidence in, and 
acceptance of the judicial system might well consider that, 
however admirable its resolute adherence to the law as it 
was, a decision contrary to the public sense of justice as it is, 
operates, so far as it is known, to diminish respect for the 
courts and for law itself.20
Perceived injustice can also arise from criminal punishment 
schemes that do not accurately reflect commonsense notions of 
desert. A variety of criminal law theorists and philosophers of law 
have recognized the possibility that disproportionate punishments 
can promote lawbreaking among citizens. For example, H. L. A. Hart 
argued that, in designing a morally acceptable system of criminal 
punishment, we should draw upon common sense notions regarding 
appropriate punishment given the gravity of the offense in question. 
He contended that if legally defined gradation of crimes differed 
sharply from the commonsense consensus, “there is a risk of either 
confusing common morality or flouting it and bringing the law into 
contempt.”21 Similarly, Kent Greenawalt has proposed that 
punishment schemes based on retributive principles can promote 
compliance with the law:
The idea is that since people naturally think in retributive 
terms, they will be disenchanted and eventually less law-
abiding if the law does not recognize that offenders should 
receive the punishment they "deserve."22
19 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
20 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 293, n.4 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Szanton, Stare Decisis; A Dissenting View, 10 HASTINGS L. J. 394, 397 (1959).
21 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 25 (1968).
22 Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 359 (1983). 
Scholars of law and society have long recognized the possibility of the Flouting 
Thesis. For example, in 1975, Lawrence Friedman wrote: 
If a person sees unfairness or illegitimacy or unworthiness of trust 
in one instance, how far does his disillusionment extend? How 
much of his attitude spills over into other areas and into his actual 
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Paul Robinson and John Darley have offered the most
comprehensive theoretical treatment of the “utility of desert”: the 
notion that by tying criminal liability and punishment to 
community-based notions of justice and desert, public compliance 
with the law will increase.23 Robinson and Darley argue that when 
the criminal law gains a reputation for assigning liability and 
punishment in ways that track the intuition of the community as a 
whole, it is more likely to be viewed as morally authoritative. As a 
result, people are more likely to defer to the commands of the law 
generally.24 Robinson and Darley argue that most people obey the 
law as a general matter not so much because they are deterred by the 
possibility of being caught and punished, but because they either 
fear disapproval from their social group or they want to do the 
morally correct thing (or both).25 But the norms held by one’s social 
group are themselves influenced and strengthened by the criminal 
law. Every criminal adjudication offers an opportunity to remind the 
public of the underlying norm that prohibits the conduct in 
question.26 Legislative proposals for new criminal law rules provide 
an occasion for public debate that strengthens the shared 
understanding of what conduct is prohibited. Further, if the law has 
moral credibility, it can guide behavior in situations in which the 
harm underlying the prohibition is not immediately obvious.27
According to Robinson and Darley, then, the moral credibility 
of the law can strengthen social norms and increase compliance. 
Because moral credibility plays a key role here, it is important to 
behavior? The hypocrisy and unfairness of Prohibition, it is said, 
brought the whole legal system into disrepute. Legal scholars 
claim that marijuana laws ‘hasten the erosion of respect for the 
law.’ But how much ‘erosion of respect’? And where? And what 
are the consequences?
 Lawrence Friedman, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE  
119 (1975). It is the answers to these open questions that I investigate 
experimentally in this Article.
23 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U.L. Rev. 453 
(1997).
24 Id. at 457.
25 Id. 468-69.
26 Id. at 472.
27 Id. at 475-76.
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understand how the law comes to be viewed as a moral authority in 
the first place. Robinson and Darley contend that the criminal law 
gains moral credibility from imposing liability and punishment only 
on conduct that deserves moral condemnation, and, conversely, 
from not imposing liability or punishment for conduct that does not 
deserve moral condemnation.28 When a particular criminal rule 
conflicts with the moral intuitions of the governed community, the 
power of the criminal law as a whole to induce compliance is in 
jeopardy, because it is no longer viewed as a trustworthy source of 
information regarding which actions are moral and which are not.29
In sum, this version of the Flouting Thesis derives from the claim 
that adopting desert-based (retributive) notions of criminal liability 
and punishment that closely track community intuitions has the 
advantage of promoting compliance.30
It is worthy to note at this point that all of the variations on 
Flouting Thesis reviewed so far share an important feature – they 
have never been tested. Although related theories have been tested 
empirically,31 an exhaustive literature search revealed no 
experimental test of the thesis that there is a relationship between 
perceived injustice of particular legal rules or decisions and reduced 
compliance with the law generally. In the next Part, I present the 
results of two experiments designed to test this claim.
II. EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FOR THE FLOUTING THESIS
A. Background: Related Theories and Evidence
Whereas there is no existing empirical evidence examining the 
connection between perceived injustice of a particular legal rule or 
decision and general noncompliance, there is evidence on associated 
questions. This evidence shows that first, people are most likely to 
obey laws that prohibit conduct they already view as morally 
reprehensible. For example, people who feel strongly that an activity 
28 Id. at 477-78.  There are separate questions of how a person decides which 
conduct deserves moral condemnation. These questions about the psychology of 
assigning blame and punishment is beyond the scope of this Article.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See  Section II.A. infra.
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prohibited by a particular criminal offense (for example, larceny) is 
morally wrong are least likely to report having committed that 
offense; likewise, people who feel less strongly that the offense is 
morally wrong are most likely to report having committed the 
offense.32 In addition to moral attitudes about specific crimes, moral 
attitudes about the legal system in general predict compliance with 
particular laws. For example, feelings of obligation to obey the law in 
general (for example, the belief that “people should obey the law 
even if they disagree”) predict whether people will comply with 
laws governing everyday acts such as littering, making noise, 
parking, and the like.33 Note that this is a different question than the 
question of interest in this Article: variations in feelings of obligation 
to obey the law generally can arise for many different reasons, 
including pre-existing variations across individuals (due to 
personality, political and moral values, and the like). By contrast, the 
question of interest in this Article focuses on the problem of a 
particular legal doctrine, rule, decision, or practice viewed by an 
entire community as unjust, and the subsequent effects on not only 
feelings of obligation to obey the law, but also on behavioral 
compliance with laws in general.
32 See Matthew Silberman, Toward a Theory of Criminal Deterrence, 41 AM. SOC. REV. 
442, 445 (1976). Similarly, Grasmick & Green surveyed people about their 
compliance with eight different criminal laws and obtained similar findings; they 
found that the people with high levels of moral commitment toward a particular 
law are more likely to report compliance with that law.  Harold G. Grasmick & 
Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval, and Internalization as 
Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 325, 334 (1980).
33 TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 41-68 (1990) (perceived legitimacy of 
legal authorities promotes compliance with the law). Compliance with the law in 
Tyler's study was associated with two main factors -- the extent to which people 
felt that the particular conduct prohibited by the law is morally wrong (consistent 
with the results reported by Silberman (1976) and Gramick & Green (1980), id.), 
and the extent to which people felt generally that the law is something that 
deserves respect and ought to be obeyed.  The first factor -- moral attitude toward 
the conduct underlying a particular law -- was associated with compliance with 
the law only to the extent that a person's moral attitude converged with the law 
with respect to the conduct in question.  In this sense, moral judgments about 
particular laws can motivate people to comply with the law, but only selectively.  
To the extent that moral attitudes and the law diverged with respect to any 
particular conduct, compliance is less likely to follow. 
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Perhaps most closely addressing the specific question that this 
Article addresses -- that of the relationship between perceived 
injustice in the law in a particular instance and more general 
attitudes about respect for the law and compliance -- is a survey 
study of tax compliance.34 In the survey, people reported on both 
their own experiences with the IRS, and on second-hand information 
about friends, neighbors, and coworkers’ experiences with the IRS.
Especially revealing were the attitudes of people who reported that a 
friend, neighbor, or coworker’s contact with the IRS resulted in that 
person paying more taxes than they supposedly owed. This type of 
vicarious experience with the IRS was associated with lower 
perceptions of the fairness of tax laws generally, and increased 
intentions to cheat on taxes in the future.35
The results of the tax study suggest that exposure to reports of 
an unjust legal outcome in a particular situation might lead to lower 
perceived fairness of the law more generally, which in turn can lead 
to non- compliance with the law in the future. The conclusions to be 
drawn from the tax survey results are, however, limited in several 
important respects. First, the data were correlational, so that the 
causal direction (if causation can be inferred at all) of the connection 
between exposure to a perceived unjust outcome and lower 
intentions to comply with the law is ambiguous. It might be, for 
example, that a person’s intention to cheat her own taxes produced 
an evaluation that others’ experiences with the IRS were unfair.
Second, the tax survey study addressed only the limited 
question of whether the justice of an outcome relating to one law (or 
set of laws) is associated with lower future compliance with that 
same law (or set of laws) -- in this case, tax laws.36 The claim I test in 
this Article, by contrast, is a stronger one: perceived injustice of a 
particular law diminishes respect for the law in general, which is 
manifested in lower levels of compliance with other laws, even those 
distinct from and unrelated to the source of the perceived injustice.
The experimental data reported below show empirically that legal 
injustice can trigger diminished compliance, not only with respect to 
34 See, Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: An
analysis of Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND 
ENFORCEMENT 264-276 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).  
35 Id.
36 Id.
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the unjust law in question, but also with respect to other unrelated 
laws. In the remainder of this Part, I use original empirical results to 
show that perceived injustice in a legal rule can generate broader
flouting of the law in everyday life.
B. Experiment 1: Testing the Flouting Thesis via Intentions to 
Comply
1. Background
To test the plausibility of the Flouting Thesis, I identified a 
specific underlying hypothesis and tested it experimentally.
According to the Flouting Thesis, the belief that a particular law is 
unjust increases the likelihood of flouting the law in one’s own daily 
life (even laws that are unrelated to the unjust law in question); 
conversely, the absence of perceived injustice should not increase 
flouting behavior. In the experiment, I presented a set of ostensible 
proposed legislation designed to be interpreted as either just or 
unjust. By carefully varying the description of the ostensible 
legislation, I ensured (through pilot testing) that participants 
perceived the laws in question as basically unjust (treatment group) 
or as basically just (control group). According to the Flouting Thesis, 
the participant’s attitude regarding the perceived justice of laws 
should diminish his or her willingness to comply with different, 
unrelated laws. 
The predictions of the Flouting Thesis focus essentially on a set 
of behavioral results: compliance with the law. At the same time, the 
predictive variable of the Flouting Thesis is a set of attitudes (about 
the injustice of specific laws). Generally speaking, however, the 
relationship between attitudes and behavior is not always 
straightforward.37 One of the factors upon which the relevant 
behavioral response depends is the accessibility in memory of the 
attitude in question. The more easily an attitude is called to mind, 
37 Indeed, the conditions under which people exhibit consistency between their 
attitudes and their behavior is a question that social psychologists continue to 
debate. See, e.g., Icek Ajzen, T.C. Brown, & F. Carvahal,  Explaining the Discrepancy 
Between Intentions and Actions: The Case of Hypothetical Bias in Contingent Valuation. 
30 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN, 1108 (in press); R. LaPiere, 
Attitudes and Actions. 13 SOCIAL FORCES  230 (1934).
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the more likely it is to influence the cognitive structure of the 
behavioral event in question, and thus the more likely a response 
will follow that is behaviorally congruent with the attitude.38 In the 
context of perceptions of the law, the extent to which an attitude 
about the justice of a particular law affects compliance behavior may 
depend on the extent to which that attitude is accessible.39
Thus, for the purposes of this experiment, it was important to 
ensure the salience in memory of the attitudes in question, here the 
perceived justice of the laws presented. For this reason, this study 
used a priming method in which the attitude is called to mind, and is 
accessible at the time compliance behavior is measured.40
2. Experimental Method
The experiment consisted of two parts. First, participants were 
exposed to a set of laws (perceived as either just or unjust) in the 
form of newspaper stories. Participants read six news stories, three 
of which focused on a legal issue, and the remaining three did not.
The three news stories describing legal statutes were interspersed 
with the non-legal news stories, thus focusing attention away from 
the purely legal nature of the task. Then, in an ostensibly separate 
study, the same people indicated their willingness to flout a set of 
unrelated laws in the future. Willingness to disobey the law 
(flouting) was measured using a questionnaire focusing on 
intentions to engage in fairly common, but legally prohibited, acts.
Newspaper stories were chosen to present the laws of interest 
in the first part of the experiment for several reasons. First, material 
presented in a newspaper story format has inherent appeal as a 
current event item and is therefore more likely to engage people’s 
interest when compared to the sometimes dense language used in 
legal statutes. Indeed, other research has demonstrated that in 
reading newspaper stories about current events can increase a 
38 See Russell H. Fazio, How do Attitudes Guide Behavior? IN HANDBOOK OF 
MOTIVATION AND COGNITION: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 204-243 (Richard 
M. Sorrentino & E.Tory Higgins eds., 1986).
39 In other words, the more salient an attitude is in memory, the more likely the 
resulting behavioral response will be attitudinally congruent.
40 A prime is a means of accessing or activating stored thoughts and concepts.  
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person’s societal-level concern about the problem at hand.41 Second, 
newspaper stories provided a convenient cover story for the first 
part of the experiment. Participants were told that the researchers 
were interested in their emotional reactions to the quality of the 
writing and the style of journalism in the news stories. In the absence 
of such a cover story, participants have been left to speculate about 
the purpose of reading legal statutes.
The participants were 98 undergraduate students.42 Upon 
entering the laboratory and signing a consent form, participants 
were informed that they would be participating in a study on the 
role of emotions in attitudes about news stories. Participants each 
read a set of six articles that were ostensibly newspaper stories.43
Three of these were filler stories (on NASA, oil drilling, and movie 
ushers), which were identical in content for all participants. Three 
were stories describing legislation, for which there were two 
versions – one set of stories was designed to elicit a perception that 
the laws described therein are just (Just Prime condition), and the 
other set was designed to elicit a perception that the laws described 
therein are unjust (Unjust Prime condition). The content of each 
version varied slightly from its counterpart, depending on the 
experimental condition. The basic topics of the law-related stories 
are illustrated in Table 1. Perceived justness was manipulated by 
varying each story’s emphasis, as follows:
41 See, Tom R. Tyler & Fay L. Cook, The Mass Media and Judgments of Risk: 
Distinguishing Impact on Personal and Societal Level Judgments, 47 J. PERS. & SOC. 
PSYCHOL.  693 (1984).
42 Of these participants, there were 54 females, 44 males, 27 African-Americans, 24 
Asians or Asian-Americans, 23 Hispanics, 22 whites, and 2 self-designated as 
“other”.
43 The length of all stories was kept constant at approximately 500 words.
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TABLE 1. CONTENT OF NEWSPAPER STORIES CONTAINING PRIMES
NEWS 
STORY
General Emphasis (both 
versions)
Just Prime Version Unjust Prime 
Version
Civil 
Forfeiture
Purpose and application of 
(actual) laws permitting the 
government to seize property 
under certain circumstances
Emphasized the law-
enforcement benefits 
of civil forfeiture laws
Emphasized the 
civil liberties 
concerns 
surrounding civil 
forfeiture laws
Income 
Tax
Proposed legislation 
ostensibly pending before 
Congress that would affect the 
amount of income tax paid by 
middle-class taxpayers
Emphasized positive 
effects of income tax 
paid by middle-class 
people
Emphasized 
negative effects 
of income tax 
paid by middle-
class people
Landlord/
Tenant
Proposed legislation 
ostensibly pending before the 
state legislature that would 
permit landlords to conduct 
warrantless searches of 
tenants’ apartments under 
certain circumstances
Emphasized 
importance of 
empowering landlords 
to evict drug dealing 
tenants 
Emphasized the 
civil liberties and 
privacy concerns 
in permitting 
searches of 
tenants’ 
apartments
A pilot test of the materials using different participants44
indicated that the legal rules described in the three law-related 
newspaper stories presented in the Just Prime condition were 
perceived to be significantly more just, on average, than those 
presented in the Unjust Prime condition.45
Participants were randomly assigned to the Just Prime or 
Unjust Prime condition. After reading each of the six stories, 
participants answered a “quiz” question, to ensure they actually 
read the story. In addition, following each story participants filled 
out a questionnaire assessing their opinion of the journalistic quality 
44 The participants in the pilot test were drawn from the same undergraduate 
population as those in the experiment itself.
45 Eighty-eight undergraduate psychology students participated in the pilot study.  
Each participant read one version of each of the three articles, and rated the extent 
to which the law described in the article was either just or unjust (1=extremely 
unjust; 9=extremely just).  Mean ratings in the Just Prime condition (M=5.05) were 
significantly higher than mean ratings in the Unjust Prime condition (M=2.95); 
t(86) = -9.25; p < .0001. Most participants (39 out of 44) in the Just Prime condition 
assigned ratings of 5 or above to the stories; nearly all participants (43 out of 44) in 
the Unjust Prime condition assigned ratings of below 5.
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of the story they just read.46 The experimenter then collected all 
materials, thanked the participants, and left the room. 
Shortly after the first experimenter left, a different 
experimenter entered the room and asked participants to sign a 
different consent form, explaining that they would be asked to 
participate in a second short experiment. After completing a short 
filler task, participants completed the Likelihood of Criminal 
Behavior Questionnaire. In this questionnaire, participants were 
asked to indicate the likelihood (from 0% to 100%) that they would 
engage in a variety of illegal behaviors. These items consisted of: 
drunk driving; parking in a no-parking zone; failing to pay required 
taxes; making illegal copies of software; eating a small item without 
paying in the grocery store; exceeding the posted speed limit; 
drinking alcohol under age 21; and taking home office supplies for 
personal use.47
3. Experimental Results
An analysis of each individual questionnaire item reveals 
that, there is an overall trend:48 participants exposed to unjust laws 
indicated a greater likelihood of engaging in each criminal behavior 
compared to those exposed to just laws. This is illustrated in Figure 
1.49
46 Participants were asked to indicate the story’s clarity, conciseness, level of 
interest, and so forth.
47 I chose these particular crimes to maximize variation in responses. Considering 
the range of acts that are prohibited by the criminal law, the six that I tested are 
fairly common among those who consider themselves law abiding citizens. Had I 
chosen relatively more serious crimes such as murder or robbery, the responses 
would have likely been clustered near 0%, making it difficult to detect any 
differences attributable to the unjust prime.
48 The tax item is the only item in Figure 1 in which there is no apparent difference 
between those primed with Just laws and those primed with Unjust laws. Note, 
however, that participants were undergraduate students, with a mean age of 18.7.  
Most of them probably have had little or no experience in filing an income tax 
return. 
49 In Figure 1, the scores are presented in raw, rather than standardized, form, for 
ease of presentation and interpretation. Item labels marked with one asterisk are 
associated with a test statistic with a p-value less than 0.10; two asterisks indicate a 
p value less than .05.
8/30/2004 FLOUTING THE LAW 17
FIGURE 1: WILLINGNESS TO FLOUT AS A FUNCTION OF EXPOSURE TO UNJUST LAWS
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Figure 1 indicates that, consistent with the Flouting Thesis, 
people exposed to the three newspaper stories describing perceived 
unjust laws are more willing to park illegally, copy unlicensed 
software, consume grocery items without paying, and pilfer office 
supplies, compared to those exposed to perceived just laws.50
A reliability analysis (Cronbach’s Alpha) indicated that the 
eight questionnaire items could be combined into a single measure 
50 For DWI, speeding, and underage drinking, the patterns were consistent with 
the Flouting Thesis, but the apparent differences did not reach conventional levels 
of statistical significance. Note that attitudes toward drunk driving have shifted 
fairly dramatically in the last decade or so, coinciding with moral campaigns 
against drunk driving (the most well-known proponent is Mothers Against Drunk 
Driving (MADD)). See, e.g., Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the 
Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 634 (2000). Because of the stigma 
currently associated with drunk driving, participants may have been reluctant to 
admit to doing it, and as a result, and there may be a “floor effect” here (the ability 
to detect differences is limited because all scores are low). Also note possible 
ceiling effects (all scores are high) with speeding and underage drinking.
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of Likelihood of Criminal Behavior,51 which was computed by 
summing scores across items.52 The standardized53 Likelihood of 
Criminal Behavior Index scores ranged from a low of -11.95 to a high 
of 12.38. Overall, participants exposed to newspaper stories 
describing laws perceived as unjust indicated a significantly54 greater 
mean willingness to engage in criminal behavior (M = 1.15) 
compared to participants exposed to laws perceived as just (M = -
0.97).55  Thus, exposure to a legal rule generally perceived to be 
unjust leads to personal estimations of a greater likelihood of 
51 Cronbach’s  = .82. Chronbach’s alpha is a measure of the reliability and internal 
consistency of a scale. Possible values range from 0 to 1. See WILLIAM L. HAYS, 
STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 230-66 (3d ed. 1981).
52 Prior to being debriefed, participants completed an Exit Questionnaire designed 
to determine whether they were suspicious that the two parts of the experiment 
were related.  The questionnaire asked participants to indicate how many studies 
they participated in during the course of the hour, the purpose of the studies, and 
the possible relationship between the studies.  An examination of the Exit 
Questionnaire responses revealed that none of the participants were suspicious as 
to the priming function of the first part of the experiment. Specifically, in response 
to the question about how many experiments they had participated in, 100% of the 
participants indicated that they had participated in two experiments.  In response 
to the question about the purpose of the studies, 0% of the participants indicated 
they thought there was any possible connection between the two tasks. Finally, in 
response to the question about whether they thought their responses in the first 
study could have affected their judgments in the second study, all but two 
participants responded “No.” These two respondents were nevertheless unable to 
articulate any basis of substantive influence of the first study on their responses in 
the second study. Moreover, excluding their data does not change the pattern of 
results reported.
53 Scores were standardized prior to being combined to account for differences in 
measurement scales across variables.  Standardizing scores distributes them across 
the same metric with Mean=0 and Standard Deviation=1. See WILLIAM L. HAYS, 
STATISTICS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 230-66 (3d ed. 1981).
54 Throughout this Article, "significantly" refers to statistical significance, which 
denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis - the possibility of no differences 
between the various groups - at a probability level indicated by the p value 
reported. Thus, "p" is defined as the probability of finding a difference or 
relationship between two groups as large as that observed if there were, in fact, no 
difference or relationship between them. See WILLIAM L. HAYS, STATISTICS FOR THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 230-66 (3d ed. 1981).
55 t(96) = 2.02; p < .05. The t statistic reported throughout this Article tests for 
differences between two independent parametric samples. Id.
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expressed willingness to engage in unrelated future criminal 
behavior.56
C. Experiment 2: Testing the Flouting Thesis via J uror Behavior
1. Background
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that when people are 
exposed to unjust laws they are more willing to engage in everyday
lawbreaking, such as traffic and software violations. The method 
used in Experiment 1 relies on self-reports -- after being exposed to 
just or unjust legal rules, participants estimated the likelihood that 
they would break the law in the future. These self-reports suggest 
that the prime had differential effects on participants’ attitudes; yet 
we cannot definitively predict behavior from such responses.57 In 
particular, measuring behavioral compliance with the law is difficult 
because of the ethical and practical problems inherent in such an 
inquiry. Ethically, difficulties arise if participants have been induced 
or encouraged to violate the law.58
56 It is notable that the exposure to perceived unjust laws was minimal in this 
experiment -- the task of reading all six news items, and answering the quiz and 
filler questions was completed in less than 35 minutes.  Yet, this short exposure 
was sufficient to significantly influence people’s expressed willingness to engage 
in unlawful behaviors in their everyday lives.  In addition, participants were 
apparently unaware of the influence that the newspaper stories had on their 
willingness to comply with the law: when explicitly asked whether the newspaper 
articles affected their judgments about compliance with the law, they denied such 
a connection.  It is also important to note here that the laws that people were 
willing to disobey were unrelated to the laws they read about previously in the 
newspaper stories.  The effect observed here spreads from the specific to the 
general.
57 See ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLEY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 155 
(1993) (the correlation between attitudes and behavior is moderate but not perfect). 
58 Laboratory experiments in which subjects are induced to engage in unethical or 
unlawful conduct to further scientific understanding of human behavior has a 
colorful history in social psychology and related disciplines. Perhaps the most 
well-known example is the set of studies conducted in the 1960s by Stanley 
Milgram in which volunteers were led to believe they were administering electric 
shocks to other volunteers. Milgram sought to understand why average, otherwise 
law-abiding citizens could engage in atrocities such as those that occurred in Nazi 
Germany. In his obedience studies, Milgram demonstrated that most people could 
be persuaded to administer (what appeared to be) painful and harmful electric 
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One alternative method for measuring compliance uses a 
mock trial paradigm. Participants play the role of jurors, and after 
hearing the trial evidence and the judge’s instructions on the law, 
they select an individual verdict preference of Guilty or Not Guilty.
The trial materials can be designed so that the evidence is 
uncontroverted (either in favor of conviction or acquittal). Thus, in 
this carefully constructed situation, if participants are to follow the 
law as given to them by the judge, then they must select the decision 
required by the uncontroverted evidence. Selection of the other 
verdict indicates that the juror has decided to engage in juror 
nullification – i.e., to not comply with the law as explained by the 
judge. This method of measuring compliance was employed in the 
present experiment, and is described in further detail below.
2. Experimental Method
a. Participants and Materials
Participants were 228 undergraduate students.59 Participants 
were exposed to a story that functioned as a prime that consisted of a 
videotaped news story from the television program “60 Minutes.”
The focus of the program was on David Cash, an 18-year-old who 
watched as his friend abducted a 7-year-old girl in the women’s 
bathroom in a Nevada casino. Upon seeing his friend restrain the 
girl, Cash walked out of the bathroom and did nothing while his 
friend raped and murdered the girl.60 Cash and the friend spent the 
next two days gambling, and Cash bragged about the crime to 
friends upon their return home to Los Angeles.
shocks to another person by applying surprising little social pressure. Milgram’s 
work on obedience to authority undoubtedly advanced our understanding of what 
Hanna Arendt has called “the banality of evil”; at the same time, the psychological 
harm experienced by human subjects in  these studies (deriving from the 
knowledge about one’s own capability and willingness to inflict harm on another 
person) is now considered by most in the scientific community to be ethically 
problematic.
59 Of these participants 152 were female; 30 were African-American, 36 were Asian 
or Asian-American, 26 were Hispanic, and 136 were white.
60 Cash claimed that he did not know a crime was in progress until after it was too 
late. He stated, however, that his friend admitted to the crime immediately after 
emerging from the bathroom.
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The 60 Minutes videotape was followed by a written story, 
which appeared to participants to be a newspaper account, but was 
actually fictional. Participants read one of two versions of the follow-
up story. In the Just Outcome story, David Cash is prosecuted for 
being an accessory to the murder after the fact, and receives a 
sentence of one year in prison. In the Unjust Outcome story, David 
Cash receives no punishment.61
In the second part of the experiment, participants served as 
mock jurors in a case unrelated to the David Cash story. The written 
materials described a homeless defendant accused of stealing a 
shopping cart he used to store his personal belongings. Participants 
were informed that stealing a shopping cart is a felony. The case 
materials indicated that the defendant had two prior felony 
convictions, and that the jurisdiction has a “three strikes and you’re 
out” rule. The materials made clear that the defendant, if found 
guilty, must be sentenced to life in prison with no possibility of 
parole. 
The undisputed facts of the case together with the judge’s 
instructions unambiguously indicated that the law requires a verdict 
of Guilty. The judge explicitly instructed the jurors that they must 
follow the law as it is given to them, and must not let sympathy or 
prejudice bias their decision. Thus, participants who rendered a Not 
Guilty “verdict” did so despite the judge’s explicit instruction that 
they were required to apply the law to the facts of the case, 
regardless of how they might feel personally about the law -- that is, 
they engaged in juror nullification.62 Each subject’s verdict 
61 Pilot testing (with different participants) revealed that on average, participants 
believed that a sentence of about a year imprisonment was a fair punishment for 
David Cash. Pilot test participants were also asked to rate the justness of the 
punishment in the David Cash story for each prime condition, on a scale from 1 
(extremely unjust) to 7 (extremely just).  Participants rated the just prime 
punishment (one year in jail for David Cash) (M = 4.21) significantly more just 
than the unjust prime (no punishment for David Cash) (M = 2.87), t(57) = -3.11, p < 
.01. There were no significant differences based on participant race or gender in 
the justness ratings of the prime (all F’s < 1).
62 The evidence presented makes clear that the homeless defendant who stole the 
shopping cart is undoubtedly guilty. It was nonetheless expected that some 
participants would be tempted to render a Not Guilty decision in this case because 
many people would view imposing a punishment of life in prison with no parole 
for a relatively minor theft offense as disproportionate and excessive. There is 
room for disagreement here, of course, as evidenced by the popular support for 
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preference of Guilty or Not Guilty thereby served as the measure of 
compliance or non-compliance with the law.
b. Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the Just Outcome or 
Unjust Outcome condition. Upon entering the laboratory, they were 
presented with the David Cash news story video, and were then 
presented with a follow-up newspaper story in which David Cash 
either was punished (Just Outcome) or was not punished (Unjust 
Outcome). A cover story was provided to ensure that the prime was 
assimilated into the later judgment: the putative purpose of the 
study was to assess participants’ judgments about the quality of the
journalism represented in the story. Participants were asked to 
provide ratings of the 60 Minutes program, as well as of the follow-
up newspaper item reporting the outcome of the case.
Questionnaires elicited participants’ opinions concerning the extent 
to which the news item was clear, in-depth, well-organized, etc. The 
questionnaires served as filler tasks.
As part of the cover story, participants were then greeted by a 
different experimenter and taken to a different room to participate in 
a “second” experiment. After signing a separate consent form, 
participants were informed that they would act as mock jurors 
whose task was to render a verdict in a criminal case. Participants 
read the trial materials, and then privately indicated their personal 
verdict preference of Guilty or Not Guilty.
3. Experimental Results
For the mock trial data, non-compliance rates were measured 
by the proportion of all participants who made Not Guilty decisions.
The higher the proportion of Not Guilty decisions, the level of 
noncompliance. According to the Flouting Thesis, observing legal 
injustice leads to non-compliance. It was expected, therefore, that 
the “three strikes and you’re out” sentencing policies that exist in several states. 
See TOM R. TYLER, ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997). The 
possibility of different reactions to the shopping cart theft case makes it 
particularly useful for these purposes, because the variation in responses permits 
detection of differences that are attributable to the justice prime.
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compared to those primed with a Just Outcome, participants primed 
with an Unjust Outcome in the David Cash case would exhibit a 
greater rate of non- compliance, in the form of a higher proportion of 
Not Guilty decisions in the case of the homeless man.63 This flouting 
hypothesis is directly contrary to another plausible effect of the 
justice prime: it might be that participants told that David Cash was 
not punished (Unjust Prime) would seek more punishment in the 
case of the homeless man, compared to participants told that David 
Cash was punished (Just Prime). This is because people who witness 
an injustice sometimes become more punitive as a result.64 This 
experiment, therefore, pits the Flouting Thesis against an alternative 
hypothesis that predicts the opposite outcome.
Analysis of the data revealed that, in fact, and contrary to my 
hypothesis, there was no statistically significant difference overall 
between Just and Unjust prime groups in proportion of Not Guilty 
decisions.65 This failure to detect a difference between the two 
primed groups suggests a boundary condition on the Flouting 
Thesis, so that perceptions of injustice might not influence 
compliance with the law in the context of juror decision making. To 
explore this possibility further, I separated the participants into two 
groups based on gender.66 This generated a total of four groups: 
63 A total of 21 participants indicated that they had heard of the David Cash story 
before. An analysis of the data excluding the these participants did not change the 
results reported  here.
64See Jennifer S. Lerner, Julie H. Goldberg & Philip E Tetlock,. Sober Second Thought: 
The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of 
Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. BULL. 563 (1998) (Participants who 
watched a film about a bully who beats up someone were more likely to behave 
punitively toward a tort defendant in an unrelated matter, compared with 
participants who did not watch the film).
65 Participants primed with an Unjust Outcome chose a verdict preference of Not 
Guilty 55.2% of the time, while participants primed with a Just outcome chose a 
verdict preference of Not Guilty 44.8% of the time. This apparent difference does 
not reach statistical significance.  2 (1) = 0.19; p = .66.
66 The nature of the David Cash case suggested examining whether gender 
moderates the role of the injustice prime on compliance behavior. This is because 
the case involved a rape, with a female victim and male perpetrators. The nature of 
this crime may well have activated gender stereotypes that differentially influence 
male and female participants. See Sheila T. Murphy, The Impact of Factual Versus 
Fictional Media Portrayals on Cultural Stereotypes, 560 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN 
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 165, 165 (1998) (demonstrating that 
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males primed with a Just Outcome, males primed with an Unjust 
Outcome, females primed with a Just Outcome, and females primed 
with an Unjust Outcome.
Next, the effects of both gender and prime, as well as the 
interaction between gender and prime, on verdict preference were 
examined.67 The Technical Appendix summarizes the logistic 
regression68 models described herein. A model that included Prime, 
Gender, and Prime x Gender as independent variables revealed that 
the Prime x Gender interaction had a significant effect on verdict, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.69 The patterns are suggestive: women were 
more likely to choose a Not Guilty verdict preference in the Unjust 
Prime condition (45.8%), than in the Just Prime condition (31.9%).70
On the other hand, men were more likely to choose a Not Guilty 
verdict preference in the Just Prime condition (56.8%) than in the 
Unjust Prime condition (38.5%).71
exposure to gender stereotypic portrayals can influence subsequent interpretations 
of unrelated events).
67 Because of the small number of non-white participants, the possible interaction 
of participant race and prime could not be examined reliably.
68 Logistic regression is a statistical technique for testing relationships between 
variables when the dependent variable (here, verdict preference) is dichotomous
or contains ordered categories (here, there are two possible verdict preferences, 
Guilty or Not Guilty. The chi-squared test statistic reported here indicates the 
overall fit of the model. See JACOB COHEN, ET AL., APPLIED MULTIPLE 
REGRESSION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 504 (3rd ed. 
2003).
69 2(1) = 5.31; p < .05
70 2 (1) = 3.02; p = .08. Note that this comparison of “simple main effects” did not 
reach conventional levels of statistical significance at p < .05. The overall Model 3 
including the interaction, however, is statistically significant at p < .05.  Id.
71 2 (1) = 2.52; p = .11. Note that this comparison did not reach conventional levels 
of statistical significance at p < .05. The overall Model 3 including the interaction, 
however, is statistically significant at p < .05.  Id
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Figure 2. Non-Compliance Rate as a Function of Gender
For female participants, the effect of Prime was similar to that 
observed in Experiment 1: exposure to a perceived unjust outcome in 
the David Cash case led to greater willingness to engage in non-
compliance, compared to exposure to a perceived just outcome. But 
for male participants, the pattern was reversed: exposure to a 
perceived just outcome in the David Cash case led to greater 
willingness to engage in non-compliance. Male participants exposed 
to a perceived unjust outcome in the David Cash case tended to 
comply more, and to indicate a verdict preference of Guilty, as 
required by the application of the judge's instructions in the 
shopping cart theft case.
The reasons for these gender differences are unclear,72 but 
may stem from differences in attitudes between males and females 
because of their historical position in the legal system.73 These 
72 The gender difference observed here was unexpected, and a definitive 
explanation for this difference requires further study.
73 See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2151, 2154-57 (1995) (“Criminal law is -- and has been for centuries -- a 
system of rules conceived and enforced by men, for men, and against men”); Mary 
Becker, The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: Access to Justice for Battered Women, 12 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 63 (2003) (“Our legal system routinely fails women who live 
26 Janice Nadler 8/30/2004
attitudinal differences may have been primed by the nature of the 
materials in the case, because the case involved a crime of violence 
against a female victim committed by male perpetrators. Consider 
first the responses of male participants who learned of a gender-
related injustice in the legal system (i.e., David Cash receives no 
punishment). The exposure to an unjust result in the David Cash 
case may have motivated male participants to reaffirm (or even 
strengthen) the legal system, and their belief that males and females 
are equally protected by it. As a result, in the subsequent task, they 
are more likely to vote Guilty in the homeless case, thereby 
complying with the judge’s instructions and upholding the rule of 
law. That is, if men feel more invested in the legal system compared 
to women, then they might be more strongly motivated to uphold 
the legitimacy of the system in the face of a threat. This motivation to 
affirm the legal system might have been exaggerated in this case 
because male participants were faced with a threat to the legitimacy 
of the legal system that raised the possibility that the law 
systematically fails to punish male perpetrators who in fact deserve 
punishment.  Thus, the unjust failure of the law to punish David 
Cash caused male participants to follow the law in the subsequent 
task and find the homeless defendant Guilty. By contrast, consider 
the male participants who learned that the legal system imposed on 
David Cash the punishment he was perceived to have deserved. A 
perceived just outcome may have confirmed for male participants 
that the legal system indeed works to serve and protect its all of its 
citizens, and in the absence of any threat to the legitimacy of the 
legal system, male participants subsequently may have felt they had 
license to bend the rules in the name of justice for the homeless 
defendant in the second task.
Contrast this pattern of responses with those of female 
participants, who may have had prior doubts about the legitimacy of 
with domestic violence…”); Susan Estrich, REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
VICTIMIZES WOMEN WHO SAY NO (1987) (arguing that the legal system fails women 
who say no); Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the 
Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1389 (1997) (arguing that the law of 
provocation as mitigation to murder is in fact biased against women despite being 
facially neutral); Victoria Nourse, The "Normal" Successes and Failures of Feminism 
and the Criminal Law, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 951 (2000) (arguing that feminist 
reforms in the criminal law have failed in certain areas).
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the legal system that were confirmed by exposure to a perceived 
unjust outcome in the David Cash case. The unjust outcome in this 
case may have made these doubts especially salient because the 
injustice involved a crime against a female victim. A prior belief that 
the legal system has not adequately served and protected the female 
participants' ingroup (i.e., females) was confirmed in the Unjust 
Outcome condition, leading female participants in that experimental 
group to feel a lesser obligation to comply with the law when it 
would lead to yet another injustice in the case of the homeless 
defendant who stole the shopping cart. In the Just Outcome 
condition where David Cash was punished, there was no such 
priming of prior beliefs about the historical failure of the legal 
system with respect to women, so that female subjects who see the 
legal system imposing on David Cash the punishment he deserved 
perhaps felt some obligation to uphold the legal system; in this case 
the legal system is affirmed by complying with the law in the case of 
the homeless man who stole the shopping cart, regardless of the 
disproportionate punishment that resulted.
It must be acknowledged that without more evidence it is not 
yet possible to provide a complete explanation for the different 
responses of men and women observed in Experiment 2. Recall that, 
as revealed in the pilot data, male and female subjects perceived a 
similar level of injustice in the Unjust Outcome version of the David 
Cash story - there were no significant differences in gender in the 
Likert scale ratings of the justness of no punishment for David Cash.
Thus, the observed differences in male and female participants’ non-
compliance rates in the second part of the experiment were unlikely 
caused by different, gender-based attitudes of the justness of the 
David Cash story prime. On the other hand, the results are consistent 
with prior research that demonstrates that men and women react 
quite differently when exposed to media portrayals involving female 
stereotypes.74 Moreoever, the pattern of results obtained in 
Experiment 2 is consistent with both of the two rival hypotheses 
74 See J. Gerard Power, Sheila Murphy, & Gail Coover, Priming Prejudice: How 
Stereotypes and Counter-Stereotypes Influence Attribution of Responsibility and 
Credibility Among Ingroups and Outgroups, 23 HUMAN COMM. RES. 36 (1996) (finding 
that, compared to women, when men are primed with a female stereotype, they 
exhibit larger shifts in credibility assessments of women’s accounts of sexual 
harassment, rape, and spouse abuse).
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presented earlier: the compliance behavior of female participants 
supports the Flouting Thesis; the compliance behavior of male 
participants supports the anger-blame hypothesis posited by Lerner 
and colleagues.75
Despite the preliminary nature of the inferences to be drawn 
from the results of Experiment 2, several features of both 
experiments are noteworthy. First, the duration of exposure to 
perceived legal injustice in the two experiments presented here was 
exceedingly brief – in some ways artificially so. In both experiments 
participants exposure to perceived legal injustice lasted no more 
than 20 minutes. Perceived legal injustice that people observe 
outside of the laboratory is sometimes longer in duration and more 
intense in its experienced effects.76 How could it be the case that brief 
exposure to unjust legal rules causes people to be less willing to 
comply with unrelated laws that regulate their everyday behavior?
In the next section, I consider explanations for the influence of 
perceived injustice on general diminished compliance.
III. PERCEIVED INJUSTICE IN THE LAW AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Can perceived legal injustices result in lower respect for the 
law generally? The experimental evidence presented here suggests 
that it can. Real life events also suggest that this is the case. Consider, 
for example, the O.J. Simpson verdict, considered to be just by some, 
but strongly opposed by many others. Opponents of the verdict
expressed strong sentiments after the verdict was publicized:
The guy is as guilty as sin. . . . This trial was a big 
fraud.77
O.J. Simpson got to go home to his big king size bed 
where he used to beat his wife. . . . I’m getting to a 
75 See Jennifer S. Lerner, Julie H. Goldberg & Philip E Tetlock,. Sober Second 
Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of 
Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. BULL. 563 (1998).
76 See the example of the O.J. Simpson trial, discussed infra in Part III.
77 Al [last name withheld].  Interviewed on NPR’s All Things Considered, 
10/12/95.
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point where I even question my belief in God.78
Because of the intense media interest focused on the case, 
many people had a strong opinion about the justice of the verdict.
For those who perceived the verdict as unjust, these perceptions 
were associated with broader perceptions about the criminal justice 
system and the law. For example, a Los Angeles Times poll 
conducted just after the Simpson verdict indicated that 70% of Los 
Angeles residents had “only some” or “very little” confidence in the 
criminal justice system.79
Consider also another case that provoked widespread 
assessments of legal injustice: the public reaction to the acquittal of 
the police officers who beat Rodney King. One half of Californians 
surveyed shortly after the trial said they had confidence in the court 
system as a result of the acquittals.80 The polling data following 
verdicts in this case as well as in the O.J. Simpson case suggest that 
perceived injustice in the law can lead to lowered respect for and 
compliance with the law. Similarly, the experimental evidence 
presented in this Article suggests that cases perceived as having 
been wrongly decided, and laws perceived to be poorly conceived or 
downright foolish, can lead to lowered respect for law generally and 
greater willingness to flout it, even in unrelated domains.
In this Part, I suggest several different possibilities to explain 
the influence of perceived injustice on willingness to flout the law in 
everyday life. Because the empirical evidence presented in this 
Article in many ways represents an initial foray into previously 
uncharted territory, the arguments that follow are presented in the 
spirit of conjectures designed to generate discussion and debate; 
more work needs to be done to demonstrate persuasively the nature 
and extent of specific factors contributing to the connection between 
perceived unjust laws and reduced compliance generally with the 
78 Cheryl [last name withheld]. Interviewed on NPR’s All Things Considered, 
10/12/95.
79 Los Angeles Times, October 8, 1995, at S2, The Simpson Legacy, by Cathleen 
Decker. See also, Los Angeles Times, October 4, 1995, at A1, Half of Americans 
Disagree with Verdict, by Cathleen Decker & Sheryl Stolberg (reporting similar 
lack of confidence in the criminal justice system in a national poll not limited to 
Los Angeles residents).
80 The Recorder, December 11, 1992, at 1, Poll Shows Courts Rate Low in Public 
Opinion, by Alexander Peters.
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law. Nonetheless, I discuss several potential explanations which are 
at least plausible given the experimental evidence. 
A. The Influence of Popular Culture on Attention to Perceived Legal 
Injustice
In the United States, popular culture is heavily influenced by 
law and the legal system. Even as early as the nineteenth century, 
Alexis de Tocqueville noted the close connection between American 
law and American culture:
As most public men are or have formerly been lawyers, 
they bring the usages and the turn of ideas that are 
their own into the handling of affairs. The jury serves 
to familiarize all classes with them. Judicial language 
thus becomes in a way the vulgar tongue; the spirit of 
the lawyer, born inside the schools and the courts, 
therefore spreads little by little beyond their precincts; 
it so to speak infiltrates all society, it descends into the 
lowest ranks…81
The propensity of the law to inhabit the popular imagination 
in the United States is more evident today than ever before.82
Hundreds of movies involve portrayals of trials.83 A substantial 
proportion of television programs focus exclusively on law, lawyers, 
or criminal justice, and television news magazines (for example 60 
Minutes, 20/20) also regularly focus on legal topics. Included in 
ABC’s fall 2004 lineup is a seven-part documentary depicting a real 
jury deciding a real capital criminal case.84 There is at least one cable 
television station (Court TV) that is devoted entirely to legal topics. 
Many best-selling novels are based on legal topics, and print news 
magazines and newspapers also devote a significant portion of space 
to law related stories.85 In sum, stories and shows about the law have 
a broad popular appeal in the United States.
81 Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, eds. Harvey C. Mansfield and 
Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 258.
82 See Chase, Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 527 (1986); 
Macaulay, Images of Law in Everyday Life: The Lessons of School, Entertainment, and 
Spectator Sports, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 185 (1987). Richard Sherwin has argued that 
law and popular culture have become so intertwined that the distinction between 
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Law related television dramas, news shows, newspapers 
articles, and novels tend to highlight certain aspects of the law (for 
example, violent crime, consumer fraud, trials, prisons) and ignore 
others for dramatic effect.86 As a result, there is a natural focus on 
whether justice is done. Viewers and readers naturally want to 
know, did the person or people depicted get what they deserve? The 
interests of justice are focal regardless of whether the story is 
criminal or civil. In either case, people notice whether the legal 
system is depicted as regulating behavior in a way that makes sense, 
or conversely, whether it is portrayed as imposing arbitrary 
demands or unfairly exempting people from punishment.87 When 
the legal system is portrayed as failing to serve the interests of justice 
reality and fiction has, to a large extent, collapsed.  Richard K. Sherwin, WHEN 
LAW GOES POP: THE VANISHING LINE BETWEEN LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE ix-x 
(2000).  Sherwin illustrates his point with the example of the videotaped grand 
jury testimony of President Clinton in which he defended himself against charges 
that he lied under oath about his sexual conduct with a young White House intern.  
The television broadcast of the testimony, viewed by millions of people, was 
featured in an article in the New York Times the following day, written by the 
paper’s movie critic, who drew comparisons between the President’s testimony 
and the film My Dinner With Andre. (The New York Times, September 22, 1998, 
Section A; at 16, The Testing of a President: In the Camera’s Eye—Critic’s 
Notebook, by Caryn James).
83 For an incomplete list, see http://www.usfca.edu/pj/index.html.
84See 
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/ABCNEWSSpecials/in_the_jury_room.html, 
last visited August 27, 2004.
85  Occasionally, a case captures the popular imagination (or at least the 
imagination of television producers and newspaper editors) and garners an 
extraordinary amount of coverage.  For example, for the nine months that the O.J. 
Simpson trial lasted, an ordinary citizen was hard pressed to avoid the case.  The 
trial itself was broadcast on every major television network on a daily basis for 133 
days (displacing devotees of soap operas and other popular daytime shows). Time, 
May 29, 1995 Volume 145, No. 22, Soap Operas: The Old and the Desperate, by 
Gina Bellafante. Coverage of the trial was recapped on the news nearly every 
night, newspapers covered the trial on a daily basis, and at the moment the verdict 
was announced, 150 million people were glued to their tv sets (even though it 
occurred in the middle of the work day).  
86 See, e.g., Michael Asimow, When Lawyers Were Heroes, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1131 
(1996).
87 See Carolyn Hafer, Do Innocent Victims Threaten the Belief in a Just World? Evidence 
From a Modified Stroop Task. 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH., 165 (2000) 
(demonstrating that small scale negative events can heighten concern for fairness).
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(whether in a drama or in news reporting on real laws or cases), the 
effects might reach farther than the particular law or legal procedure 
that is the focus of the show or news story.88 A portrayal of injustice 
in the legal system may cause people to question the integrity of not 
only the particular law, or judge, or jury, or attorney portrayed, but 
may also cause them to call into question the integrity of the legal 
system itself.
The cultural influences that lead people to question the integrity 
of legal system might also have consequences that emerge 
behaviorally – that is, people might violate the law more than they 
would have if they did not question the law’s integrity. In the next
section, I will argue that compliance decisions are supported and 
sustained by community norms of commonsense justice. In the 
context of a general perception that the legal system is generally just, 
these norms nourish a baseline level of behavioral compliance with 
the law. But if the delicate balance that encourages compliance is 
disturbed, these same community norms can provide the impetus to 
flout the law.
B. Expressive Law, Perceived Injustice, & Compliance
The delicate balance that promotes compliance is assisted 
enormously by the fact that much of the time, the law accurately 
reflects prevalent mores about permissible behavior.89 Thus, criminal 
law prohibits murder, rape, robbery, larceny, and a host of other 
acts, the propriety of which almost everyone agrees. The general 
convergence of the requirements of the law and commonsense 
justice means that most people comply with the law most of the 
time, because they would have refrained from doing the prohibited 
act, whether it is murder, rape, or robbery, quite apart from the 
existence of its legally prohibited status.
88 See Jennifer S. Lerner, Julie H. Goldberg & Philip E Tetlock,. Sober Second 
Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of 
Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. BULL. 563 (1998); J. Gerard Power, 
Sheila Murphy, & Gail Coover, Priming Prejudice: How Stereotypes and Counter-
Stereotypes Influence Attribution of Responsibility and Credibility Among Ingroups and 
Outgroups, 23 HUMAN COMM. RES. 36 (1996).
89 See Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 
339, 375 (2000).
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On the other hand, people also refrain from legally prohibited 
acts that they may be genuinely tempted to engage in, such as 
certain traffic offenses (for example, driving through a red light at an 
empty intersection), or offenses against other persons (for example, 
punching someone who they feel really deserves it). Democratically 
produced legislation, for example, can be perceived as a signal of 
community norms about behavior.90 In declaring conduct to be 
prohibited, the law expresses social disapproval of that conduct, 
which can itself strengthen people’s commitment to acting legally—
even when the fear of punishment is absent.91 Such moral 
commitments can operate even on people who have not internalized 
them, through social pressure to avoid the loss of esteem in others’ 
eyes that would result from engaging in prohibited conduct.92 In this 
90 See McAdams, supra note 28.
91 Id. 
92 See JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 112 (1974); Richard H. 
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 
355 (1997).  McAdams argues that we generally seek the esteem (good opinion, 
respect) of others.  So long as there is a consensus about the esteem-worthiness of 
engaging in a particular behavior, and so long as people know that there is some 
risk of detection if they engage in that behavior, then a social norm can arise 
governing the behavior. There is some empirical support for this notion.  The 
threat of peer disapproval exerts a significant influence on self-reported decisions 
to engage in a criminal offense.  See Grasmick & Green, supra note 7. 
This idea of norm-regulated behavior is also captured in social 
psychological theories, such as Fishbein & Ajzen's theory of reasoned action, 
which takes into account "subjective norms" in modeling the attitude-behavior 
relation.  According to the theory of reasoned action, the most important predictor 
of behavior – intention -- is in turn determined by a person's attitude toward the 
behavior and by the subjective norm.  The subjective norm is simply the person’s 
perception that relevant others in the social environment expect him or her to 
behave in a certain way.  Thus, if a person behaves in a manner contrary to social 
expectations, he or she can expect negative social consequences.  See MARTIN 
FISHBEIN & ICEK AJZEN, BELIEF, ATTITUDE, INTENTION, AND BEHAVIOR: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND RESEARCH (1975).
Of course, social norms vary across cultures and populations. The 
sociologist Elijah Anderson has argued that among inner-city African-American 
youth, there is a code of the street that is centered on the issue of respect.  See Elijah 
Anderson, Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Lie of the Inner City, 273 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY 81, 88 (1999).  As a result, a person must maintain an 
appearance (including clothing, gait, facial and verbal expression) that 
communicates willingness to engage in violence when necessary, must be willing 
to engage in the violent resolution of disputes, and must be willing to seek revenge 
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way, the law itself informs people’s ideas about moral and immoral 
behavior. 
To some extent, people also obey the law because they feel they 
owe a general obligation to legitimate authority.93 If the law is 
generally seen as accurately reflecting community norms, it is 
intuitively plausible that people will be more inclined to defer to it as 
a moral authority.94 Under these circumstances, the very labeling of a 
certain act as criminal might make people more aware of the socially 
harmful quality of that act.95 For example, before the existence of 
severe criminal punishments for drunk driving, many people were 
unaware that drunk driving had such grave consequences. It may be 
that drunk driving is increasingly considered in moral terms 
precisely because it has been labeled criminal.96
Thus, laws that plausibly signal community attitudes result in 
deference and compliance, even if the value expressed had not been 
previously internalized by all members of the community, as in the 
drunk driving example. Severe punishment for drunk driving 
signals the risk of severe harm associated with the act; the previously 
established moral credibility of the law generally ensures that the 
signal will be heeded. However, laws that are perceived as 
in the event of a threat to one’s self-esteem, all to ensure that respect is secured and 
maintained.  
As another example, norms motivated by fear of peer stigma regarding 
honor and violence are very different in the Southern U.S., compared to the 
Northern U.S.  See Dov Cohen et al., When You Call Me That, Smile!  How Norms for 
Politeness, Interactions Styles, and Aggression Work Together in Southern Culture, 62  
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 257 (1999).  Southern white males follow norms of honor, 
whereby they feel that if they do not respond to an insult, others will view them as 
less manly.  Because this Southern culture of honor has features that involve 
undercurrents of violence, norms of politeness and hospitality have evolved in the 
South that function to keep conflicts below the surface.  Thus, the behavioral ritual 
of using anger, rudeness, biting humor, and insults as warning mechanisms for 
curbing others' offensive behaviors is more commonly observed in the North.  In 
sum, although there may be variation in social norms across sub-populations, they 
nonetheless play an important causal role in explaining factors that motivate 
behaviors that are observed with regularity within a community.  Id.
93 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 41-68 (1990).
94 See  Robinson & Darley, supra note 5 at 476.  
95 See Andenaes, supra note 30.
96 But in the example of drunk driving, it also might be the case that law followed 
changes in social norms.  See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the 
Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000).
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completely implausible signals of community attitudes -- that is, 
laws that strike people as so far off the mark that they could not 
possibly represent what the community believes or values – are 
likely to have different effects. If the law is seen as imposing unjust 
or immoral obligations, then rather than signaling community 
attitudes, the law instead might be perceived as irrelevant, and 
intuitively, there would be little reason to defer to it as a moral 
authority.97 For example, if the criminal law were to prohibit all 
sexual intercourse between unmarried couples, most people would 
view that law as discrepant from their own personal moral views 
about sexual intercourse; as a result, they would be willing to 
disobey the law. Further, such a law might have an even broader 
effect. It might cause people to view the law generally in a different 
light – as a set of irrelevant and arbitrary rules rather than a coherent 
expression of community values.98
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS
Recognition of initial sources of perceived injustice is a 
necessary condition for controlling the general diminished 
compliance it triggers.99 The sources of perceived injustice that are 
discussed in this Article generally fall into two categories: perceived 
unjust legal decisions, such as jury verdicts, and perceived unjust 
legislation. The problem of perceptions of unjust jury verdicts is 
perhaps the more difficult problem from a policy perspective.
Criminal jury verdicts that are perceived to be unjust oftentimes are 
97See Robinson & Darley, supra note 5 at 476.
98 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 5 at 473-476.  See also Cooter, supra note 8. It is 
worth noting that perceptions of injustice might vary by community, where legal 
rules that govern issues that are of particular importance within a particular 
community are subject to closer scrutiny.  If a legal rule seems outrageously unjust 
to members of a community, this might cause a decline in the moral authority of 
the law in that community and not in other communities.  Thus, a legal rule 
mandating English-Only might be perceived as unjust by Latino communities; a 
set of legal rules that mandate harsher prison sentences for cocaine in crack form 
than cocaine in powder form might be perceived as unjust by African-American 
communities; a legal rule prohibiting free downloading of music via the Internet 
might be perceived as unjust by communities of music fans; a legal rule 
prohibiting possession of firearms might be perceived as unjust by the citizenry in 
discrete parts of the country.
99 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 5 at 488.
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indeed unjust from a narrow distributive justice perspective: 
factually guilty people are sometimes acquitted by juries, and as a 
result, people who have in fact committed a criminal act sometimes 
do not receive their just desert. Likewise, factually innocent people 
are sometimes convicted by juries. Of course, acquittals represent a 
judgment on the part of the fact finder (i.e. the jury or judge) that the
prosecution has not met its burden of proof, and so many acquittals 
that appear unjust from a narrow distributive justice perspective are 
morally defensible when procedural justice considerations are taken 
into account. Nevertheless, many people find it difficult to give 
proper weight to procedural justice considerations once they have 
made an assessment about the “correct” outcome from a distributive 
perspective. For example, from the point of view of a person who 
believes that O.J. Simpson did in fact kill two people without 
justification or excuse, there is little solace in the prospect that the 
jury held reasonable doubts about the prosecution having proved 
every element of each crime – the distributive justice worry 
overwhelms procedural justice concerns in this context.100 In sum, 
because information about jury verdicts is, and should be,101
available to the public, perceived unjust jury verdicts are bound to 
occur, and to cause general diminished compliance in the ways 
outlined in this Article.
A second prototype of perceived legal injustice is legislation
or other legal rules that conflict with commonsense notions of what 
justice requires. Perhaps the most salient historical example is the 
prohibition on the manufacture, distribution or sale of alcoholic 
100 See infra  notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
101 It is possible that televising criminal trials may exacerbate feelings of perceived 
injustice regarding verdicts in notorious cases. On the other hand, televised trials 
provide a unique opportunity to educate the public about the importance of 
procedural and other safeguards that sometimes lead to verdicts that are unjust 
from a narrow distributive perspective but that serve the interests of justice in 
other ways. The considerations weighing in favor of and against the televising of 
criminal trials are numerous and extend beyond the scope of this Article. See, Ruth 
Ann Strickland & Richter H. Moore, Jr., Cameras in State Courts: A Historical 
Perspective, 78 JUDICATURE 128, 135 (1994);  Kelly L. Cripe, Comment: Empowering the 
Audience: Television's Role in the Diminishing Respect for the American Judicial System, 
6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 235 (1999); David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court 
TV, Conventional Television, and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 
35 ARIZ. L. REV. 785 (1993).
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beverages imposed by the Eighteenth Amendment. During the 
period when the Eighteenth Amendment was in force, the law 
prohibiting alcohol was notoriously disobeyed.102 Toward the end of 
the prohibition era, prominent leaders worried that such widespread 
lawlessness had weakened respect for the law generally, leading to 
widespread diminished compliance with laws unrelated to 
prohibition – that is, they worried about the Flouting Thesis.103
Contemporary examples are not always associated with the same 
extent of widespread disobedience, but these examples provoke 
controversy and heated discussion nonetheless. These include 
particular aspects of drug laws (such as the crack/powder cocaine 
sentence disparity implicit in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines),104
mandatory minimum sentences of incarceration for certain crimes,105
sodomy statutes,106 foster care regulations,107 and smoking 
ordinances,108 to name just a few. 
Laws that are enacted with the intention to change social 
norms and behavior sometimes are met with resistance if the law 
departs too substantially from the view of ordinary people.109
Outside of courtroom verdicts, many discrepancies between laws 
and attitudes represent avoidable sources of lawbreaking, because 
perceptions of injustice and the diminished respect for the legal 
system that follow can destabilize the law-abiding behavior of 
102 See Harry G. Levine, The Birth of American Alcohol Control: Prohibition, the Power 
Elite and the Problem of Lawlessness. 1985 CONTEMPORARY DRUG PROBLEMS 63 (1985); 
DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL Prohibition (1979).
103 See id.
104 See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283 
(1995)(“By demanding too much doctrinal order, we have produced a doctrine 
that demands too little justice”). William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1795 (1998) (“Differential enforcement breeds resentment, 
which undermines the law's normative force”).
105 See Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years after the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How 
Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87 (2003); Susan R. Klein & Jordan M. Steiker, The Search for 
Equality in Criminal Sentencing, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 223.
106 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
107 See DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS (2002).
108 See, e.g., The New York Times, May 12, 2004 at A1, A City of Quitters? In Strict 
New York, 11% Fewer Smokers, by Richard Perez-Pena.
109 See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000).
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ordinary people.110 By limiting the incongruities between the 
condemnation expressed by a particular legal rule and the severity of 
condemnation implicit in public attitudes, perceived injustice can be 
diminished.111 The key question, then, is how to go about reducing 
discrepancies between legal rules and citizen attitudes.
In principle, there are several ways to better harmonize legal 
rules and public attitudes. If there is an existing social norm 
regarding the issue addressed by the law, one method involves 
reforming the legal rule in question to better align it with the existing 
social norm; another method involves altering the social norm to 
better align it with the existing legal rule.112 Legal rules sometimes 
do not directly implicate social norms, but instead implicate what 
are better described as socially shared attitudes. In these cases, it is 
possible to conform the law to public attitudes. I discuss these 
possibilities in turn.
Modifying the legal rule to better reflect the existing social 
norm involves a number of considerations. First, we must first make 
a determination that the existing norm promotes desirable social 
policies and that the legal rule is not as effective as the existing social 
norm. Thus we must decide that we want the legal rule to look more 
like the social norm. Of course, it is not always the case that the 
social norm is laudable. Historically, there are many instances of 
prevailing social norms that in retrospect many would agree were 
wrongheaded. These include the norm against the equal 
participation of women, racial minorities and gays and lesbians in 
social and political life; the norm against homosexual sex; norms 
against interracial marriage; norms permitting harm to the 
environment such as littering and polluting the air and water, to 
name just a few. 
Second, assuming the existing norm is desirable, we must 
make a determination that there is in fact a unified social norm to 
which we can conform the legal rule. This is often not the case. For 
example, some of the most contentious issues of the day such as 
same sex marriage, abortion, physician assisted suicide, and the 
death penalty involve such deep differences of opinion that we 
110 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 5 at 476.
111 See id.
112 Of course, these two methods are not mutually exclusive; both the rule and the 
social norm can be modified in an attempt to make them more compatible.
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cannot hope to neatly conform the legal rule to existing norms.113 In 
these cases our best strategy is to rely on fair procedures to ensure 
that the decisions of legal actors are viewed as legitimate and thus
likely to be complied with.114
Sometimes, the legal rule in question does not really implicate a 
social norm so much as it implicates a socially shared attitude about 
what justice requires. In these situations, it is possible to measure 
empirically the socially shared attitude and then conform the law to 
the consensus (assuming that there is no independent reason to think 
that the consensus makes for bad legal policy).115 For example, 
criminal law rules governing attempted crimes do not really 
implicate an existing, articulable social norm regarding when and 
whether it is permissible to attempt to commit crimes. Nevertheless,
people are likely to have intuitions about what type of conduct 
ought to be punished as attempt crimes in specific situations.116
Moreover, social scientists using the right types of survey 
instruments and samples ought to be able to measure these popular 
intuitions.117
That this type of endeavor is possible was demonstrated by 
Paul Robinson & John Darley in their book Justice, Liability and 
Blame.118 They tested several different criminal law rules (e.g., 
attempt, justification, excuse, and so on) against the opinions of 
citizens regarding what the content of these rules should be. But 
instead of asking questions about criminal law rules in the abstract, 
the authors asked people to give their opinions about factual 
scenarios. For example, should a person who cases out a jewelry 
store with the intention to burglarize it, but then goes no further, be 
held criminally liable for attempting to commit a crime? From these 
responses they inferred what people thought the rule ought to be.
Robinson and Darley found that although modern criminal law 
doctrine imposes liability as soon as a person takes a substantial step 
toward an offense, most people would impose no punishment when 
113 See TOM R. TYLER, ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997).
114 See id.
115 See PAUL ROBINSON & JOHN DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME (1995).
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 PAUL ROBINSON & JOHN DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME (1995).
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faced with the facts of such a case.119 Where the legal rule departs 
from the consensus of the lay public regarding just desert, 
lawmakers can modify the legal rule to reflect popular consensus, so 
long as such consensus can be justified in criminal law theory. This 
assumes, of course, that the theoretical considerations that led to the 
adoption of the original rule do not overwhelm the reasons for 
adopting the new, more “popular” rule. In the case of attempt crime 
standards, there is a proliferation of different approaches, and there 
seems to be no real consensus among scholars or lawmakers about 
which approach is superior.120 In this case, therefore, a sensible 
approach might be to adopt the rule that best accords with common 
sense notions of what justice requires.121
The second main way to reduce the gap between legal rules 
and common sense justice is to change the prevailing conception of 
justice. Education of the public regarding legal rules and procedures 
is a key method to pursue. Most people are woefully unaware of 
119 Id. At 205.
120 These include: the physical proximity doctrine (liability imposed if act directly 
tends toward completion of the crime), the dangerous proximity doctrine (liability 
for attempt more likely as gravity and probability of the crime, as well as the 
proximity of the act to the completed crime, increases), the indispensable element 
test (liability imposed when the defendant has control over all indispensable 
aspects of the crime), the probable desistance test (liability imposed if the crime 
intended will result without interruption from outside sources), the abnormal step 
test (liability imposed when defendant goes beyond the point where most others 
would desist), the unequivocality test (liability imposed when the defendant’s 
conduct manifests an intent to commit the crime), and the substantial step test 
(liability imposed when defendant does any act that constitutes a substantial step 
toward commission of the crime). See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CRIMINAL LAW 749-50 (3rd Ed. 2003).
121 An important caveat is in order at this point. This type of inquiry must by 
nature be grounded in data. One cannot establish the criminal law in the 
community’s sense of justice when claims about this sense of justice are based only 
on the speaker’s own intuitions, which the speaker assumes are shared by the 
public at large. Instead, this inquiry must be grounded in the community’s sense 
of justice as measured by empirical observation.  JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND 
BLAME is a step in the right direction in this regard. As other commentators have 
observed (see Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice Just Us? 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 601, 605 
(2000)), there are methodological issues regarding sampling in these studies, but it 
is important to keep in mind that this was an initial foray into the measurement of 
community justice intuitions.
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existing legal requirements.122 One study asked the residents of five 
different states about their knowledge of four different criminal law 
rules.123 In each of the states the criminal law took a minority view 
on at least on of the four rules, so that the rules tested varied from 
state to state.124 Yet, residents of each of the five states tested had 
essentially identical beliefs about the law in their state.125 The actual 
legal rule in effect in their state apparently had little or no influence 
on what people believed the rule to be. In fact, people’s beliefs about 
what the law is in their state did not track so much the majority rule 
as they tracked people’s own moral intuitions about what they 
thought the rule ought to be.126
Given the goal of reducing the gap between legal rules and 
common sense justice, the challenge is not only to educate people 
about the content of existing legal rules, but in addition, to facilitate 
a public understanding of the rationale for existing rules. Sometimes, 
the facts of a well-publicized criminal case will help to make known 
an existing, but previously little-known legal rule; but if the rationale 
for the rule is not transparent, that rule might fall into disrepute if it 
is contrary to common sense notions of justice, or if it leads to a 
result widely regarded as unjust.127 In addition, the perception of an 
unjust result might arise because of application of procedural rules 
that most would regard as just and necessary if only they were made 
aware of the existence of the procedural safeguard and associated 
rationale.128
Experiment 2 demonstrated that perceptions of injustice can 
have different consequences that depend on the gender of the 
122 See John M. Darley, Kevin M. Carlsmith and Paul H. Robinson, The Ex Ante 
Function of the Criminal Law, 35 LAW & SOC REV 165 (2001).
123 Id. The rules tested were: duty to assist a stranger in danger, the use of deadly 
defensive force in situations where the victim can safely retreat, duty to report a 
known felony, and the use of deadly force in protection of property.
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 See Robinson & Darley, supra note 5 at 476.
128 See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 
CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003).
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perceiver.129 Recall that women were more likely to engage in juror 
nullification than men when primed with a case involving rape. This 
result suggests that, in examining gaps between law and common 
sense justice, it is especially important to scrutinize areas in which 
the law operates to the systematic disadvantage of women. It has 
been long recognized that the law should formally bestow equal 
treatment to men and women.130 But culture and social practices 
operate to dominate women under laws that often are facially 
neutral.131 I argued in the beginning of this Part that recognizing 
sources of perceived injustice is a necessary condition for controlling 
the general diminished compliance it triggers.132 Because there are 
many sources of perceived injustice in the law,133 it seems difficult to 
know where to begin the process of recognizing and narrowing gaps 
between commonsense justice and legal requirements. The results of 
Experiment 2 suggest one particular area in which to begin: places 
where the criminal law operates to the systematic detriment of 
women. This work has already begun,134 but there is undoubtedly 
much work left to be done.
CONCLUSION
This Article explored the widely-assumed but little-tested belief 
that specific instances of perceived injustice in the legal system can 
lead to diminished deference to the law generally. Experiment 1 
tested the influence of perceived unjust legal rules regarding civil 
forfeiture, distribution of the income tax burden, and the right to 
privacy, and demonstrated that perceived unjust legal rules cause 
people to report being more likely to engage in lawbreaking in their 
daily lives. Experiment 2 tested the influence of a perceived unjust 
outcome of a criminal case in which a person peripherally involved 
129 It is likely that other characteristics, such as race and ethnicity, play a role here 
as well. The small sample size in Experiment 2 did not permit an examination of 
the effects of race and ethnicity. This is, however, a topic ripe for further research.
130 See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Notes from a First Generation, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 99, 99.
131 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 40 (1987).
132 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
134 See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 68; Becker, supra note 68; Estrich supra note 68; 
Nourse, supra note 68.
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in a serious crime is not prosecuted. Experiment 2 demonstrated that 
the failure to punish a person who is perceived to deserve 
punishment can, in some circumstances, lead people to display a 
greater willingness to disregard the law in their role as jurors. This 
willingness to flout, however, was qualified by the gender of the 
mock juror and the facts surrounding the perceived injustice: in a 
rape case where a potential accomplice goes unpunished, women are 
more willing than men to disregard the law in their role of jurors. 
These stark gender differences highlight the need for more research 
regarding the Flouting Thesis. It is undoubtedly false that perceived 
injustice in the legal system leads to greater willingness to break the 
law for all people, in all circumstances, at all times. This Article 
presents the first experimental evidence that such a relationship 
exists at all; but as such it is only a start, and more research is needed 
to understand the contours of this relationship.
The notion that specific instances of legal rules, practices, and 
decisions that clash with common sense notions of justice can 
promote widespread lawbreaking is an idea with far reaching
implications for policies about the content of criminal law rules and 
sentencing regimes, for promoting public education and awareness 
about the legal system and about the rationales that underlie
controversial rules and procedures, and for examining and 
rethinking legal rules and policies that can promote diminished 
respect for the legal system. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for Likelihood of Guilty Verdict as 
a Function of Prime and Gender
Variable Model 1: b Wald 2 Model 2: b Wald 2 Model 3: b Wald 2
Intercept -.19   .19  .17  .40 -.27   .67
Prime Condition    .38  3.72 -.13  .22   .74   2.52
Gender  .33 1.32  1.03  6.01*
Prime x Gender -1.33  5.31*
Model 2    .19   1.52    6.92^
-2 Log L 310.17 310.37 303.44
^ p < .10
    *
 p < .05
